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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
4 3 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4 912
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 920206
FRANK GENE POWELL,
Category No. 1
Defendant-Appellant,
JURISDICTION OP THE SUPREME COURT
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah State
Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2(a)-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is the appellate court precluded from considering the

issue of whether or not the trial court committed

error in

instructing the jury where trial counsel did object to the giving
of instructions at the time of trial?
2. Is the appellate court prohibited from considering whether
the Appellant should have been sentenced to a lesser offense where
trial counsel did not raise the issue at the time of trial?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
The dispositive provisions are as set forth in Appellant's
brief on appeal.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
This matter comes before the Supreme Court in the manner set
forth in Appellant's brief on appeal.

This brief is offered in

reply to the brief of the Appellee,
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment against FRANK GENE POWELL
for Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree. Appellant was
convicted by a jury after a trial which commenced the 1st day of
April, 1992, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, presiding.

After the verdict

of the jury, Appellant was sentenced to a term of five (5) years to
life in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts of this case are as set forth in Appellant's brief
on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellee asserts that the Appellant is barred from raising the
issues of whether or not the juror was properly instructed by the
trial court and whether or not the Appellant should have been
sentenced to a lesser offense where trial counsel did not raise
those issues at the time of trial.
instructing
definition

of
of

the
terms

jury

Appellant argues that the

in a homicide

constituting

case

elements

concerning
of

the

the

offense

constituted prejudicial error, plain error and manifest error.
Said failure being fundamental prejudicial to the Appellant.
Appellant argues that the court has the right to correct an
2

improper sentence at any time and that the failure to do so would
result in a denial of equal protection of the law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT CAN REVIEW THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS CHALLENGED
IN APPELLANT'S POINT I OF HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL AS
THE ERROR WAS PLAIN ERROR
Appellee has declined to brief the issues raised by Point I of
Appellant's brief on appeal which questioned the instructions to
the

jury

given

by

the

court

defining

the

term

"depraved

indifference." Appellee's basis for failing to brief was that the
issue had not been raised by the Defendant at the time of trial and
that Appellant had not claimed the failure to properly instructconstituted "plain error."
In Appellantfs argument, while not specifically using the term
"plain error" to describe the nature and seriousness of the failure
to properly instruct, it pointed out that the prior decision of
this Court

in the State v. Standiford, case, 769 P. 2d 263,

specifically dealt with the issue raised by Appellant and stated
that the trial court should instruct the jury clearly on the legal
definition of "depraved indifference" instead of leaving that
determination to the individual experience and knowledge of the
jurors.

769 P.2d at 261.

Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that error may be assigned to the instructions even though no
objection was made at the time of trial where the error would
result in "manifest injustice."

That term has been held by the
3

appellate courts to be essentially the same as the term "plain
error."

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)-

Appellant

submits that his argument under Point I of his brief on appeal
raises the failure of the court to instruct to constitute manifest
or plain error.

Both of the requirements of the plain error

doctrine are met. First, the error is plain in that this Court has
specifically treated the need in a case such as the present one to
define

clearly

the

difference

between

the

terms

"depraved

indifference" and "reckless." The instruction of the trial court
failed to make any meaningful distinction or specific definition of
the critical terms.

Further, the instruction given by the trial

court erroneously informed the jurors that the Appellant need not
be aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause death.
Where an appellate court has specifically provided guidance in an
area, it would seem to logically follow that the trial courts
should follow said guidance, especially where the failure to do so
may result in a defendant being convicted of a greater offense than
otherwise.
As to the second prong of the plain error rule, Appellant
submits that it is obvious that a different result may have
occurred in his case had the jury been properly instructed.

The

danger of his being improperly convicted as a result of the
improper instructions of the court is magnified by the fact that
the court instructed the jury to consider first the question of his
guilt under the second degree homicide instructions which included
the "depraved indifference" definition, before they considered
4

lesser offenses, one of which was reckless manslaughter.
Appellant submits that the "reasonably certain" language of
the instruction concerning the term "knowingly," is a lesser
standard than that required by Standiford of "a highly likely
probability."

See 7 69 P.2d at 264. This error further increases

the likelihood that a properly instructed jury would reach a more
favorable conclusion for the Appellant.
Finally, although Appellant did not specifically use the term
"plain error" in regard to his argument on the instructions under
Point I of his brief on appeal, in Point II of Appellant's brief on
appeal, the issue of plain error was raised in the argument
concerning other of the instructions of the court.

Appellant

urges this Court to consider his arguments under Point I as the
failure

to

properly

instruct

in

such

a

critical

area

does

constitute plain error or manifest injustice.
POINT II
THE COURT MAY REVIEW THE ISSUE OP WHETHER OR NOT THE
APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY AS A COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO CORRECT
AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE AT ANY TIME
Appellee has argued that the argument set forth in Appellant's
brief on appeal, Point V, should not be considered by this Court
since the issue was not raised at the trial court level. Appellant
contends that the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e),
provides that a court can correct an illegal sentence at any time.
Where, as argued in Points I, II, III, and IV of Appellant's brief,
there are substantial

questions raised concerning

the jury's

ability to differentiate between the crimes of criminal homicide
5

murder in the second degree and reckless manslaughter, if the
conduct of the Appellant comes within either of the statutes, he is
entitled to the lesser penalty.
properly

instruct

on

the

Where the trial court failed to

difference

between

the

"depraved

indifference" term of second degree murder and the "reckless" term
of manslaughter, under the definition given by the court, the same
conduct of the Appellant could come within either statute. In such
a case, it is proper that the Defendant receive the lesser
sentence.

See State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1987); State v.

Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 435 P.2d 146 (1969).
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that for the reasons set forth above, this
Court should consider all issues raised in Appellant's brief on
appeal and grant the relief requested therein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of March, 1993.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4)
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to Jan Graham,
Utah Attorney General, and Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney
General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 this 4th
day of March, 1993.
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated, §78-2(a)-3(2)(d)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 19(c)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e)

7

281

JUDICIAL CODE

(Ji On January 1 1W2, the circuit courts in the
Filth. Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts are established as district courts in those municipalities where
the circuit courts currently are located Circuit court
ludcos of these judicial districts shall he district court
judges as o( that date Judges of these districts shall
stand for unopposed retention election as required by
law
('*) The authority ot the Judicial Council to replace
a vacant circuit court judicial position with a court
commissioner position within the limits established
under Subsection (1) shall expire January 1,1996.
1991 (2nd S & )

78-1-3. Effect of act on election functions.
(1) Any justice or judge of a court of record, whose
election to office was effective on or before July 1,
1985, shall hold the office for the remainder of the
term to which he was elected The justice or judge is
subject to an unopposed retention election as provided
by law at the general election immediately preceding
the expiration of the respective term of office.
(2) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose
appointment to office was effective on or before July
1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed retention election
as provided by law at the first general election held
more than three years after the date of the appointment
(3) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose
appointment to office was effective after July 1, 1985,
is subject to an unopposed retention election as pro\ ided by law at the first general election held more
than three years after the date of the appointment.

78-2-2

Supreme Court The chief |ustice m.i\ he iemo\ed
from the office of chief justice bv a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court
(4) If the justices are unahle to elect a chief justice
within 30 days of a vacancv in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a
chief justice is elected under this section If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as
chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has
duties as provided by law.
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of the associate chief justice is
two years. The associate chief justice may serve in
that office no more than two successive terms. The
associate chief justice shall be elected by a majority
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law.
19<K1

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.
78-2-2.

Repealed.

1971. 1981

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
1968
the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
CHAPTER 2
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
SUPREME COURT
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
Section
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
78-2-1.
Number of justices — Terms — Chief including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
justice and associate chief justice —
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
Selection and functions.
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
7o-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
78-2-2.
Supreme Court junsdiction.
Court of Appeals;
78-2-3
Repealed.
(c) discipline of lawyers;
78-2-4
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Compro tempore, and practice of law.
mission;
78-2-5.
Repealed.
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica78-2-6
Appellate court administrator.
tive proceedings originating with:
78-2-7.
Repealed.
(i) the Public Service Commission;
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
7^-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
7H-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief jus(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
tice and associate chief justice — Se(v) the state engineer;
lection and functions.
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court
• 1' The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
'2» A justice of the Supreme Court shall be apagencies under Subsection (e);
pointed initially to serve until the first general elec(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
tion held more than three years after the effective
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office
record holding a statute of the United States or
°f a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
commences on the first Monday in January following
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
the da it- of election. A justice whose term expires may
Constitution;
H#rv
e upon request of the Judicial Council until a
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
accessor is appointed and qualified.
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi* • The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a
tal felony;
c
hief justice from among the members of the court by
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
d
majority vote of all justices. The term of the office of
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
1
'^f justice is four years The chief justice may serve
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
Recessive terms The chief justice may resign from
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
••" office of chief justice without resigning from the
not have original appellate jurisdiction

w»

wuimnNAL

rKUl

LIJLKK-

spt'Ltivi-juror <tnd an> party, witness or person
ih) A statutory exemption from service.ialleged to base been victimized or injured by the
a privilege of the person exempted and ,
defendant, which relationship when viewed obground for challenge for cause
jectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
(i) When the jury is selected an oath .-h J
ministered to the jurors, in substance, that in
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilleach of them will well and truly try the m.ring to return a verdict which would be free of
issue between the parties, and render a tru<
favoritism. A prospective jur
-hall not be disaccording to the evidence and the instruction
qualified solely because he is iebted to or emcourt.
ployed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof.
Rule 19. Instructions.
(5) having been or being the party adverse to
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such .
the defendant in a civil action, or having comtime as the court reasonably directs, any p a m •
plained against or having been accused by him in
file written request that the court instruct the mr
a criminal prosecution;
the law as set forth in the request. At the sanu
(6) having served on the grand jury which
copies of such requests shall be furnished to th»-..»
found the indictment;
parties. The court shall inform counsel of us pp,;..
(7) having served on a trial jury which has
action upon the request; and it shall furnish u.'.r ..
tried another person for the particular offense
with a copy of its proposed instructions, u n k charged;
parties stipulate that such instructions may be «j.\. •
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
try the same charge, and whose verdict was set
(b) Upon each written request so presented ,r..
aside, or which was discharged without a verdict
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its deei-;. •
after the case was submitted to it;
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and par(9) having served as a juror in a civil action
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by th.
brought against the defendant for the act
endorsement what part of the charge was given and
what part was refused.
charged as an offense;
(c) No party may assign as error any portion <•! tK
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with
death, the entertaining of such conscientious charge or omission therefrom unless he objectthereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinct i,
opinions about the death penalty as would prethe matter to which he objects and the ground of h:clude the juror from voting to impose the death
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to objeu
penalty following conviction regardless of the
error may be assigned to instructions in order to
facts;
avoid a manifest injustice.
(11) because he is or, within one year preced(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence 1 n
ing, has been engaged or interested in carrying
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence-,
on any business, calling or employment, the carit shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive
rying on of which is a violation of law, where
judges of all questions of fact.
defendant is charged with a like offense;
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be
(12) because he has been a witness, either for
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unle.>or against the defendant on the preliminary exotherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time
amination or before the grand jury;
for argument shall be within the discretion of the
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualicourt.
fied opinion or belief as to whether the defendant
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary.
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are un
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either
necessary. It is sufficient that a party state his objec
tions to the actions of the court and the reasons thereparty, which will prevent him from acting imparfor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling
tially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging; but no person or order, the absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him.
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matRule 21. Verdict
ter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty'
upon public rumor, statements in public journals
or "not guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity,"
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears
"guilty and mentally ill," or "not guilty of the crime
to the court that the juror can and will, notwithcharged but guilty of a lesser included offense," or
standing such opinion, act impartially and fairly
"not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a lesser
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
included offense and mentally ill" provided that when
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by
the defense of mental illness has been asserted and
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately.
the defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was
Challenges for cause shall be completed before peinsane at the time of the commission of the offense
remptory challenges are taken.
charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by reason of
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be
insanity."
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be rethey are called, shall replace jurors who are, or beturned by the jury to the judge in open court and in
come, unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the deThe prosecution and defense shall each have one adfendant voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may
ditional peremptory challenge for each alternate jube received in his absence.
ror to be chosen.
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, any time during its deliberations may return a vertake the same oath and enjoy the same privileges as dict or verdicts with respect to any defendant as to
regular jurors.
whom it has agreed If the jury cannot agree with

Rule 22

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(8> If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment
shall, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board, be made a condition of parole.
Failure to continue treatment or other condition of
parole except by agreement with the designated mental health services provider and the Board of Pardons
is a basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The
period of parole may not be for fewer than five years
or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence,
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced without consideration by the Board of Pardons of a current report on the mental health status of the offender.
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by
the sentencing court, shall be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board
shall make treatment a condition of probation if
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facilities exist for treatment of the offender in a probation status. Reports as specified by the trial judge
shall be filed with the probation officer and the
sentencing court.
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other condition of probation, except by agreement with the
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, is a basis for the initiation of probation violation hearings. The period of probation
may not be for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of a current
report on the mental health status of the offender.
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided
by or under contract with the Division of Mental
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board, any other mental health provider. A report shall be filed with the probation officer and
the sentencing court every three months during
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition
to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report.
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation
may not be heard more than once every six
months.
(10> "(a) With regard to persons committed by the
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility
under this section prior to July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall petition the court within 60 days after that date for
review of those orders. The court shall review
and modify those orders to include commitment
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.
(b) With regard to persons who have been
placed on probation by the sentencing court under Subsection (9) prior to July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act. the executive director of the
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall
petition the court within 60 days after that date
for review of those orders. The court shall review
and modify those orders to include placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2.

ing sentence which shall be not less than two
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea uni? *
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant . >*
erwise orders. Pending sentence, the court mav c<»mit the defendant or may continue or alter bail
recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford •
defendant an opportunity to make a statement m »
own behalf and to present any information in miiiu
tion of punishment, or to show any legal cause wh
sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting ,,'•'
torney shall also be given an opportunity to pres»r
any information material to the imposition of s*-n
tence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant ma> u
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced m
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for str,
tence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by th»court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of m,
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the
plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant of his right to appeal and the time within
which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, i he
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make his return
on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for impos-

Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached,
order a commitment until the defendant is charged
anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may
be just and proper under the circumstances.
Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems
reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in
the same position as if no trial had been held and the
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either
in evidence or in argument.

